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1  Introduction 
Public works are frequently employed as social protection programmes to meet the dual 
challenges of short-term poverty reduction and long-term asset creation. If offered 
repeatedly, public works act as a buffer-stock to stabilise the labour market, providing that 
the wages paid are not too high to draw workers away from the jobs offered at market rate. 
Unskilled jobs offered in rural areas can slow down migration to urban labour centres, and 
help rural communities to build pro-poor critical assets. Public works programmes are a 
special type of transfers which are conditional on the completion of the work requirement; 
with secondary and multiplier employment effects. Evaluations for Africa suggest that cash 
transfers tend to be spent, and food transfers consumed, and confirm that the latter have 
negligible multiplier impacts. Social protection based upon public works is, in part, popular 
because it avoids the trade-off between productive investment and expenditure on welfare, 
and offers the benefit of self-targeting by the poor. 
The former is critical since public works, given their non-labour costs, are typically 
much more expensive than simple cash transfers, and must therefore be justified in terms 
of superior contributions to the accumulation of long-term assets and skills. The latter is 
important since it saves the expenses involved in setting-up means-tested institutions to 
identify the poor, and developing countries typically lack such institutions even if they could 
fund them. Dependable public works with repeated access are capable of acting as 
insurance against income shocks even when they fail to have an impact on poverty. 
However, this is often achieved at the expense of dropping poverty reduction as a 
policy objective. Moreover, public works programmes have a mixed record on the 
participation of the small and marginal farmers among the poor. These shortcomings have 
led some to conclude that “public works projects cannot effectively achieve both [short-run 
and long-run] goals simultaneously and should generally have one or other as their primary 
objective”, Barrett et al., (2005). This seems an overtly pessimistic assessment of public 
works as a tool for social protection, despite their limitations. 
The main aim of this paper is to bring together some experiences of public works 
programmes in the developing world that offer some insight into their design as dual-
purpose social protection schemes for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). More especially, Section 2 
outlines three issues which are critical to the success of public works in protecting the 
vulnerable, and which simultaneously create pro-poor assets. The issues examined concern 
the predictability and durability of public works, the effects of the programme’s wage rate 
on the market wage for unskilled labour, and how the programme relates to the 
participation of poor but labour-constrained subsistence farmers. These are then illustrated 
through public works performances in Argentina, India, and Ethiopia in Section 3; the 
concluding remarks appear in Section 4. 
2  Critical Factors for Designing Public Works 
Programmes 
Cash transfers addressed to labour-based vulnerabilities can remove a major source of 
weather-related covariate risk, namely, a fall in demand for labour. However, the 
predictability of such transfers is essential if public works plans are to function as dual-
purpose social protection schemes as defined elsewhere in this report. When households 
have confident expectations of receiving regular transfers, in cash or in kind, they are 
encouraged to take more risk, and invest more in productive assets to achieve a higher-
return. Labour-based social protection can offer such predictability through a programme of 
public works aimed at the provision of assets, skills development, and the wage transfers. 
However, one-off or short-term public works offer very limited scope for asset or skill 
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accumulation, and, even then they lack the degree of predictability offered by schemes 
based upon repeated access. Moreover, experience in Africa indicates that temporary public 
employment tends to focus on a wage transfer without much skills development, which is 
critical to enable the participants to obtain better-paid jobs in the future. Hence, the crucial 
issue for public works programmes is whether they can function as transformative social 
protection by achieving a threshold of assets and skills bundle that will enable future 
accumulation, and sustained improvement in livelihoods. Such an outcome is unlikely with 
temporary employment that functions as “wage-shocks” without the consumption 
smoothing potential of a sustained public works programme, see Section 4. As short-term 
programmes, simple unconditional cash transfers are less expensive and superior to public 
works1. It is therefore crucial to realise that the fulfilment of the above functions requires 
longer-term public work schemes, or repeated access, in order to achieve the critical 
stabilisation benefit, or the insurance function of public works. 
In principle, it may also be possible to achieve these functions with a short-term 
programme based upon a sufficiently high transfer wage rate. However, a public works 
programme wage rate must necessarily be set low in order to achieve its self-targeting 
potential of attracting the poor to the programme. This is often taken to mean a programme 
wage rate below the minimum market wage rate for unskilled labour. The rationale is that 
public works should not crowd out existing employment; offering a wage rate above the 
market level attracts labour already employed, and destroys its self-targeting mechanism. 
However, in practice, the task of setting the wage rate low enough to avoid the excess 
demand generated by attracting the relatively well-off to the programme (job rationing) has 
not proved easy, and often the minimum wage rate of projects is higher than the market 
wage. To avoid job rationing, the programme wage must be below the unskilled market 
minimum wage rates.2 Some public works programmes have managed to set programme 
wages below the market rate, but often this is the result of favourable circumstances rather 
than the result of careful policy design.3 Other public works have offered employment based 
upon programme wage rates typically well below the subsistence level. Indeed, at times of 
drought or other covariate shocks, in addition to the poor, many others turn to public works 
programmes for employment, resulting in a breakdown of the pro-poor self-targeting 
mechanism. To restore this mechanism, the official policy has usually been to reduce 
programme wage to sub-subsistence levels. However, evidence indicates that even very 
limited amounts of conditional wage transfers still attract the poor to the programme, as 
small transfers can act as insurance schemes for those vulnerable to poverty even though 
its impact on reducing poverty is negligible. This suggests that regular, predictable low 
wage transfers benefit the vulnerable more than erratic higher income, and there is some 
evidence for this view from the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) 
discussed below. The problem with this rather standard response to wage-setting is that it 
abandons the most attractive feature of social protection, namely, its dual function as an 
asset building, growth-enhancing approach, and as a poverty-reduction strategy. The latter 
is no longer a policy feature of public works once a below subsistence wage-rate is adopted 
with implications for under-nourishment, and for the depletion of participants’ health stocks, 
                                                 
1  For a recent study of the effects of temporary transfers on consumption-smoothing that suggest 
they act a transitory income shocks with little long-run impact on saving, see Christianensen and 
Pan (2010). 
2  This is best achieved flexibly when local rates are based upon local labour market conditions; it is 
generally undesirable to have one national public works programme rate applicable to all local 
markets. 
3  For instance, the Korean government set its successful public works wage below the market rate in 
the aftermath of the late 1990s crisis, and as the market rate subsequently rose, the government 
was able to adjust its wage offer downward because the offer was still slightly above the official 
minimum wage, and the latter had remained very low for a long time; see Subbarao (2003). 
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which run contrary to the objectives of social protection schemes. This is particularly clear in 
public works based upon food, rather than cash, transfers. In food-for-work (FFW) schemes, 
payment is typically based upon the minimal survival requirement, a food ration that is 
constant across rainfall regimes. Due to the production covariate, and imperfectly integrated 
rural markets, the food prices move inversely with rainfall, so food prices are high in 
drought years. Consequently, a nominal rise in food prices relative to the (constant) 
physical rations, which attracts not only the poor but also the non-poor participants, leads 
to job rationing precisely when the poor need employment most. FFW schemes then 
become an ineffective tool for self-targeting the poor. To regain this function, a/one 
common policy attempt is to reduce the subsistence wage food ration; there is some 
evidence that dramatic cuts in the wheat ration levels still attack the poor participants in the 
FFW programmes.4 Therefore, apart from the latter, the dilemma of public works wage-
setting seems to lie either in offering an above-subsistence wage, and inviting a breakdown 
in the programme’s self-selectivity, or in restoring this mechanism but abandoning poverty 
reduction as one of the policy aims of social protection. 
If, however, the implementation of a public works scheme eventually leads to raising 
the level of local minimum wage, then there will be fiscal space to revert back to the 
programme’s subsistence wage level without undermining its self-targeting. Gaiha (1997) 
has tested the hypothesis that the availability of public works raises, albeit with a time-lag, 
the local agricultural wages, and suggests various causes for this rise in wages. One is the 
programme’s impact on productivity which results from communally-created assets. Since 
labour productivity increases are likely to benefit mainly large- and medium-sized farmers, 
who are the main private employers, a shift in demand for hired labour is likely to follow. In 
addition, a/one consequence of assured employment during slack seasons is a rise in the 
minimum reservation wage of agricultural labour. The combined effect of the two may lead 
to more than moderate agricultural wage increases.5 Gaiha’s (1997) evidence for India 
suggests such effects are likely to be significant. 
Given the impact of public works on raising market wages, a preferred alternative to 
cutting the programme wage, especially if the latter is based upon a minimum nutritional 
requirement, would be a temporary increase in the amount of work required while retaining 
the programme’s wage-rate. This would be effective in labour-surplus regions if the 
programme’s work-time requirements remain relatively modest. In this alternative, labour 
preformed is still in return for a conditional subsistence wage transfer, or a constant wage 
ration, but the quantity of labour supply required for programme participation would be 
increased temporarily until its market wage effects became evident. This would then weed 
out the non-poor participants, restore self-targeting for the poor, and preserve the 
programme’s anti-poverty impact in terms of survival food intake. It would lower the 
nominal price of the wage transfer, and make it easier to keep it below the market rate in 
order to avoid crowding out. In short, this alternative offers more room for programme 
wage-setting based upon retaining the dual objectives of social protection approach. 
Poverty among labour-constrained households adds another layer of complexity to 
the determination of a minimum wage for a public works programme. Where the rural poor 
are mainly labour-constrained due to on-farm employment as subsistence producers, they 
would have higher a minimum reservation wage-rate than landless labourers; thus, a higher 
programme wage-rate than those obtained by labour-surplus poor households must be on 
offer to elicit their participation. Barrett and Clay (2003) have argued that the presence of 
                                                 
4  However, an increase in the required work time in drought and lean seasons without a cut in food 
ration may be a preferred alternative; see below. 
5  There may also be that wages increase due to public works availability in regions where large land-
owners are important employers; their bargaining will be weakened if there is organised wage 
negotiation. 
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labour-constrained poor implies that targeting errors are “structural” and are, therefore, 
unavoidable; provided evidence for rural Ethiopia that appears to indicate that targeting of 
FFW schemes is rather weak.6 Barrett and Clay (2003) also point out that participants with a 
low ratio of labour to non-labour endowments, for example, land, cattle, etc., choose cash 
payment over food, while those with a high ratio of labour to non-labour assets prefer 
payment in food rations over cash. This makes sense and can help policy design. 
In practice, however, some remedies are available to reduce the extent of the self-
targeting errors which result from implementation of public works schemes that miss out 
the labour-constrained poor households. One is to allow of the required labour time to be 
carried out on private land of such households, provided eligibility is defined carefully to 
avoid diverting resources to non-poor land owning farmers. Allowing asset creation on 
private land of small/marginal farmers would have also the advantage of moderating moral 
hazard around who will ensure durability and sustainability of communal assets. Second, 
allowing conditional cash transfer in return for work in a mixture of food and cash is also 
helpful. Greater scope for payment in cash rather than food grains would benefit labour-
constrained participants with small/marginal plots.7 The method of wage payment is another 
policy option. The common practice is based upon daily payment, but piece-rates and task-
based payments are especially attractive to women, and allow several members of a large, 
poor family to share the work. In some African countries, women prefer task-based 
payments since it permits them to combine household chores and income earning 
opportunities. Finally, if public works wages lead, with a time-lag, to a rise in market wage 
rates, there will be room to raise the programme rate and still remain below the market 
rate. The enhanced programme wage offer would come closer to minimum reservation wage 
rates of labour-constrained households, bringing more of them into the programme. 
3  Some Country Experiences with Public Works 
This section examines some country experiences and features of few of well-known 
conditional cash and food transfers programmes based on public works that are likely to be 
relevant for designing social protection schemes in SSA. These are Argentina’s Plan Jefes y 
Jefas (Jefes), India’s MEGS (Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme), the National 
Food for Work Programme (NFFWP), and NREG (National Rural Employment Guarantee), 
and Ethiopia’s PSNP (Public Safety Net Programme). 
At the end of 2001, Argentina experienced a severe economic crisis with sharp 
increases in unemployment and poverty. Jefes was the main safety-net response of the 
government, an unconditional cash transfer programme that quickly developed into a 
conditional transfer in return for work once its initial costs and the extent of its capture by 
the non-poor had been evident. In 2002, Jefes offered a cash transfer of 150 pesos per 
month to each individual, the equivalent of one half of the mean household income per 
capita per month. Eligible for participation were household heads with dependents, mainly 
children below the age of 18. However, the coverage errors were substantial due to the 
inability of the programme to verify the unemployment status of the applicants based upon 
this criterion. Over half of Argentina’s employment is in the informal sector, but the 
programme could only verify formal sector job status with confidence. This led to the 
introduction of a counterwork condition to improve the programme’s targeting of the poor. 
Jefes required participants to do 20 hours of basic community work, training activities, 
                                                 
6  It should be noted that evidence of this study comes from a cross-section sample. Moreover, Bezu 
and Holden (2008) suggest, also from rural Ethiopia, that the FFW is effective in helping the poor 
with on-farm investment and that it improves its pro-poor self-targeting mechanism. 
7  FWW programme have also unconditional cash transfers that are typically restricted to households 
with no labour to spare, for example, the elderly, those looking after the AIDS-infected family 
members, etc. 
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school attendance, or employment in a private company with a wage subsidy for six 
months. Evaluations suggest the impact of Jefes on the unemployed was limited because its 
eligibility criteria were poorly enforced: one-third of those receiving the cash did not satisfy 
the eligibility criteria, and three-fourths of those eligible for the transfer did not receive any 
cash. Some point to a large share of female beneficiaries as a positive employment gain, 
but evidence indicates most female applicants were inactive rather than unemployed, 
suggesting lower male participation was due to the higher opportunity costs of alternative 
work for men. So, while assuming that all participants would have been otherwise 
unemployed results in an over-estimate 5.8 % points fall in the unemployment rate due to 
Jefes, factoring in alternative work reduces that rate by more than half, to 2.5 % points, 
according to Galasso and Ravallion (2003). As for the impact of Jefes on poverty, at a 
poverty line of 100 pesos per month, the poverty rate amongst its participants fell from 
82% to 70%, and the programme had only a small impact on the national poverty rate. 
Despite these shortcomings, Jefes had a significant impact, due to its repeated access, on 
protecting the vulnerable: an extra 10 % of the participants would have fallen into extreme 
poverty in the absence of the programme; the drop in real income for the non-participants 
was, on average, 250 pesos per month, relative to the 150 pesos decline for the Jefes 
beneficiaries, Galasso (2008). The explanation for this outcome lies in the programme 
wage-rate being set below both the minimum and market rates. While the transfers were 
relatively too small to have a significant impact on poverty reduction, they were sufficiently 
large enough to protect the vulnerable from falling into poverty. The experience in this case 
demonstrates that improved targeting through reduced programme wage-rate was achieved 
at the expense of poverty reduction. 
India has had a long history of public work schemes, and experience from three such 
schemes are particularly relevant for SSA, namely, MEGS, NFFWP, and the more recent and 
much larger NREG. The success of the MEGS experience provided the main impetus behind 
the expansion of NREG to the whole of rural India in 2007. The MEGS was implemented in 
1979 in the state of Maharashtra, a semi-arid region with a highly seasonal agriculture and 
large amount of unemployment in lean periods, with the aim of reducing poverty and 
creating assets that benefit the poor, based upon a low cost self-targeting mechanism. The 
projects had to meet two criteria: to be labour-intensive, and to create productive assets. 
The intensity requirement is defined strictly in 51:49 ratio of labour to non-labour costs. The 
MEGS projects include water, soil, and land conservation works, afforestation, roads, and 
food projects. Although participation in MEGS fell sharply in 1988, the programme’s 
targeting accuracy has increased in recent years: 60% of participants were poor or 
extremely poor, with their MEGS earnings accounting for 18 to 40% of total household 
income, confirming the programme’s income stabilisation effect on the poor who would 
otherwise have had to make costly adjustments through consumption or wealth reductions. 
During the period 1991-96, the share of female participants ranged between 30 and 39%, 
though the expected rates should have been higher with better child-care facilities, and 
shorter distances to work sites. 
The importance of setting the public works wage-rate correctly for effective targeting 
is evident from the experience of MEGS. From its beginning, the MEGS wage-rate was linked 
to the local state-determined minimum wage. The programme was initially enormously 
successful in drawing vast numbers of the poor, especially women, to work sites because its 
wage-rate was low enough to promote self-selection. However, in 1988, the minimum wage 
was doubled, and so was the market-linked programme wage. The consequence was a 
significant drop in the number of days of employment per person generated. Thus, the 
upward revision of the wage-rate contributed to job rationing as the relatively-affluent join 
the scheme, rationing the poor out of the programme, and eroded the “guarantee” feature 
of the programme. However, although the transfers declined following the wage hike in 
1988, the stabilisation (consumption-smoothing) benefits, as under Jefes, remained 
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significant and continued to be so even after 1988 because the scheme continued to operate 
intensively in off-peak agricultural seasons; see Odi (2006), and Subbarao (2003). 
NREGA covers both MEGS and NFFWP; it basically replicates most features of MEGS 
for the entire rural India, incorporating the 150 most backward regions covered by NFFWP. 
The emphasis of NREG, as in MEGS, is on repeated access in recognition of the need for 
predictability as a condition for productive asset accumulation; NREG guarantees 100 days 
of work per rural household per year upon demand to anyone able and willing to work at 
district-specific agricultural minimum wages, or an equivalent unemployment allowance if 
the state fails to provide work within 15 days of application. All adults, not just those below 
the poverty line, can apply for work. NREG was started in a pilot phase in 2006 with 200 
selected poor rural districts, and, based upon the evidence for programme effectiveness 
from that phase, was scaled up to cover all rural India in 2008. Its record of employment 
generation has so far been much better than previous programmes: covering 31 million 
households per year, and with a far higher female participation rate than previous public 
work schemes. The projects implemented are largely projects of water conservation (60%), 
but also of road connectivity (16%), and land development (13%); see Dutta and O’Keefe 
(2008). In the first year of the programme (2006-2007), an average of 43 days of work per 
applicant was achieved; an average of 42 days for 2007-08. However, only 10% of all 
applicants completed 100 days of work. This was partly due to the use of contractors (for 
digging wells) who have a preference for employing machinery over labour, but the impact 
is still vastly superior to the public works record of earlier Indian public employment 
schemes. Moreover, the programme requires that at least one-third of the beneficiaries be 
women, and women constituted 46% of the persons working in 2007-08, partly as a result 
of male migration from labour-surplus regions; Mehrotra (2009). 
In 2004, India launched the NFFWP to provide the 150 most backward districts with 
additional supplementary food resources through public employment. Its chief feature was 
that wages were paid mainly in kind at a rate of 5 kg. of food grain per person day, and, in 
some 25% of cases, the wages were paid in cash; cash payment also substituted part of 
wages in kind, usually when the food supply was inadequate. Wages were equal for both 
men and women labourers, paid in accordance with the minimum wage-rates as set by the 
provisional government. As the latter were usually higher than the slack period agricultural 
wage-rate, targeting accuracy was not high. The programme was fully sponsored by the 
central government, but district-level authorities were put in charge of its planning, 
execution, organisation, supervision, and monitoring. The NFFWP has since been subsumed 
in NREG. An assessment of the welfare impact of NFFWP suggests most of its benefits, 
meant to target the poor, were captured by non-poor; Jha et al., (2009). While landowning 
participants experienced lower poverty, change in the incidence of poverty amongst the 
other two main social categories, Social Castes (SC), also known as Untouchables, and 
Social Tribes (ST) is less clear. Targeting amongst SCs worsened over time, and there 
appears to be a higher degree of capture amongst the SCs than amongst STs. Moreover, 
there is evidence of capture by the fourth quintile of SCs, STs, and landowners. This not 
only suggests that targeting can be improved by focusing on more income classes than on 
social groups, but it also offers indirect evidence of the crowding out effects of the 
programme’s minimum wage. In slack seasons and at times of drought, the real wage 
payment in kind, in fixed quantity of 5 kg. of grain for a day’s work, increases as food prices 
rise, attracting the non-poor to the programme. Note, however, that the programme’s 
capture was not due to any inherent feature of NFFWP related to payment in food, but a 
feature of its wage-rate being too high even during lean seasons. As with Jefes, the 
response was to lower the wage-rate in order to improve the programme’s self-targeting by 
the poor. However, such a response undermines the nutritional status of the poor, who are 
unlikely to benefit from the lowering of the wage-rate in kind since the amount is usually 
determined as subsistence requirement. As noted above, the MEGS faced a similar problem 
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in 1988; it doubled the programme minimum wage, and had to restore its targeting function 
by a sharp wage cut. Neither of these solutions is consistent with a dual purpose social 
protection approach of reducing vulnerability and promoting asset accumulation. In the light 
of the empirical evidence on elevating the impact of public works on market wage-rates in 
rural India, a temporary rise in the required labour-time would, at least to some extent, 
resolve this dilemma, by improving self-targeting by the poor without necessitating cuts in 
the programme wage-rate. 
Ethiopia has had to devise public works programmes to deal with a history of famine, 
and droughts. The Ethiopian Employment Generation Scheme is the largest in SSA in terms 
of numbers employed, an average of 5 million per year for over a decade. Ethiopia’s more 
recent PSNP, funded primarily by multilateral donors, aims to protect household assets and 
to create productive community assets. It is a conditional transfer both in cash and in kind, 
of food grains, based upon public works, with a smaller component of unconditional direct 
food transfer to those unable to work, for example, children, the elderly, people infected 
with HIV, etc. PSNP focuses on food insecure areas as defined by the lowest administrative 
levels in Ethiopia. Eligibility is based upon three years of continuous dependence on relief, 
and on presence of adult able-bodied members who also work for non-working members, 
for example, children. Households with no labour to spare receive direct food support; 
Sharp et al., (2006). There is evidence of good capacity-building community structures; 
Devereux (2006). The community identifies the types of public works, usually schools, 
roads, soil and water conservation, and water development (spring, irrigation, ponds). 
Public works must result in communal asset-creation with one exception: namely, 
investment undertaken on land run by poor female-headed households. This exception is 
notable for the type of flexibility required for improving self-targeting for labour-constrained 
poor households as discussed above, but it is probably not enough in those regions 
dominated by subsistence agriculture. The plans and budgets for the projects are 
determined at district level, with an upper limit of 20% on capital and administrative 
expenditure; the programme operates, especially in the highlands, during the “hunger 
season”, running from January to June. The PSNP is complemented by food security 
schemes for credit, investment, and agricultural technical support through a Household 
Asset Building Programme, and Community Complementary Investments programme, all 
under the government’s umbrella of the Food Security Programme (FSP) to improve 
participants’ lives enabling them to graduate from the PSNP. A household has graduated 
when, in the absence of receiving PSNP transfers, it can meet its food needs for all 12 
months of a year and withstand modest shocks. However, reluctance among the 
participants to leave the PSNP is widespread because of weak incentives, IDL Group (2010). 
The food ration covers the energy requirements of the average family of six including 
the FWW participant, offering 1,800 kcal per head per day. The PSNP wage-rate, kept below 
the market wage-rate, is set at a transfer equivalent of 15 kg. of cereal in cash and food in 
return for work of 8 hours a day, five days per month per each household member;8 the 
same amount of food is made available for unconditional support transfers to those unable 
to work. The government considers payment in cash to have a better impact on 
development, and believes this should be promoted in preference to payment in food as far 
as possible. The choice between food and cash payment mainly depends on the availability 
of grain on the market; the food option is maintained as long as local markets cannot 
deliver the required food, but is scaled back when they can. PSNP thus appears to allow no 
payment in cash to participants from subsistence food producing households during slack 
seasons. While cash is distributed on a monthly basis through community representatives, 
food distribution-points are more limited due to the need for storage facilities. PSNP exit 
                                                 
8  However, among those eligible households, some, who do not have enough labour to work the five 
days per household member, earn less than the full entitlement for their family. 
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strategy is to enable participants to reach critical thresholds for asset accumulation and 
expanded earning over a five-year period.  
According to recent assessments based on non-representative panel data, by 
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010), and Devereux and Guenther (2009), the PSNP had 
an asset-protection impact, in that the beneficiaries show significantly higher growth in 
income and assets compared with non-beneficiaries. Income growth and asset growth (in 
terms of livestock) over 2006-08 for those receiving wages in food was 59% and 62% 
respectively, although no similar effect was detectable for participants receiving cash-only. 
However, Gilligan et. Al. (2009), using a larger representative panel survey, suggest more 
modest impacts for the PSNP, also between 2006 and 2008: an increase in food security by 
11% (measured by the increase in the number of months the household can satisfy food 
needs) and a 7% increase in livestock holdings. The impact assessment of this study, 
however, is not based on the distinction of outcomes between the cash and food-paid 
participants. 
It should be noted that food price inflation in 2008 resulted in large-scale shocks to 
incomes, even for the PSNP participants. A study by Save the Children (2008) in the 
Amhara region between January 2007 and February 2008 indicates that the price of maize 
rose from 2 to 3 birr per day. The government responded with a rise in the PSNP wage-rate 
from 6 to 8 birr per day. However, maize prices continued to rise and at the end of the 2008 
PSNP transfer in July, the 8 birr wage-rate, only secured 1.2 kg. of cereal on local markets - 
a 56% loss of purchasing power for the poorest and most food-insecure households in rural 
Amhara over just a seven-month period. Evidence on the local market responses in food-
insecure regions to food price increases do not support the PSNP cash approach. The case of 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and the People’s Region (SNNPR) as the hardest hit region 
during the 2008 food-market failure, illustrates this point well. SNNPR had been one of the 
PSNP’s most successful regions, shifting almost entirely to cash-only transfers in 2007, only 
to suffer a large-scale nutrition and child-mortality crisis under the impact of the 2008 food 
price inflation. This trend is reflected in the PSNP participants’ very strong preference for the 
food method of payment; Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2010). It should be mentioned 
that, given the huge domestic-import food price gap, the Save the Children (2008) 
calculation indicates that the most expensive method for donors to support PSNP’s 15 kg. of 
food wage-rate is to provide the cash equivalent, while the most cost-effective alternative is 
to import food into the country. The usual worries about the possible development of 
dependency syndrome have been dispelled by empirical evidence produced by Andersson et 
al., (2009). They have found no evidence that PSNP leads to dis-investment in livestock or 
in trees. On the contrary, the number of livestock and trees increases for households 
involved in PSNP. 
Quite different participation outcomes are reported in Barrett and Clay (2003) for 
rural Ethiopia if the poor have some land, and, hence, limited labour to contribute to a 
public works programme. Such households would require higher wages, compared to 
landless poor, in order to give them an incentive to participate, suggesting all public work 
schemes based upon a uniform wage-rate will fail to target the poor effectively as different 
wage-rates must be offered to labour-constrained and labour-surplus poor households in 
order to illicit similar participation.9 Moreover, they find that, for those above 2 kg. food 
ration, participation always increases if wage payment is in cash rather than food, which 
                                                 
9  The sample in this study contains data for three levels of food wage rations at which participation 
would be forthcoming: 2 kg., 6 kg., and 9 kg. of wheat. The authors find little positive relationship 
between absolute household wealth or income levels, and household reservation wage levels, but a 
strong correlation between the former and the ratios relating household’s endowment of labour, 
land and assets - it is the ratio of labour to non-labour productive inputs that derives minimum 
reservation wage levels. 
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suggests that the participants were net food producers, or at least food-secure households; 
for the latter, payment in cash has a premium over payment in food grain. 
Two related studies for Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray examined the crowding 
effects of the PSNP with reference to the participating farmers labour on their own farms for 
land conservation and fertiliser use.10 The evidence from one study, Holden et al., (2003), 
shows that 57% of the sample households participated in FFW projects at lower wages, and 
households choose to participate at wages as low as 1.1 kg. of wheat per day. The results 
suggest a crowding in, rather than a crowding out, effect, as FFW increases private 
investment in land conservation. A related study on the effect of FFW on the use of 
fertilisers on private plots, Bezu and Holden (2008), comes to the same conclusion. During 
2000-01, 60% of households used fertiliser, of whom two-thirds were FFW participants; 
each receiving an average of 154 kg. of wheat as FWW income in that year, and used, on 
average, 58 kg. of fertiliser on their farms. There was no disincentive effect, as the 
availability of FFW jobs during the slack season does not compete with farming on private 
plots. Although more than 85% of the households were not food self-sufficient in 2001, the 
FFW wage for participating food deficit households amounted to 20% of the deficit. Once 
again, such outcomes display the dilemma of public work schemes. The programme wage 
cuts still performed some degree of protective insurance, but at the expense of abandoning 
its poverty-reducing potential, which is especially evident in Ethiopia, as the food wage-rate 
is based upon the minimum energy requirement of an average person, and not on some 
minimum indexed to the lowest market wage. An alternative policy would be to allow public 
works on small and marginal lands. However, as the experience of the MEGS demonstrated, 
such schemes should be carefully and narrowly defined in order to prevent the relatively 
affluent farmers from reaping the benefits, for example, excluding farmers above the 
poverty line. However, in lean seasons, the choice between on-farm and off-farm work 
largely disappears, and the problem becomes one of securing work for food, in which food 
wage transfers can offer dual market protection, with improved targeting if the amounts of 
work required are temporarily increased. 
If the poor in parts of SSA consist mainly of subsistence farmers constrained by 
labour shortages, the FFW schemes should give a larger role to the cash component of the 
programme, paying households with low ratios of labour to land, or assets, mainly or 
entirely in cash. Another modification would be to allow asset-creation on private land based 
upon some parts of the labour required to be performed on small/marginal farms in defined 
exceptional categories such as in the PSNP for female-headed households. A change in the 
method of payment can also increase the participation of labour-constrained households. 
Piecemeal payment is often preferably to time payment, Subbarao (2003). Finally, note 
that, during lean seasons, the gap between minimum reservation and market wage-rates 
would narrow substantially due to limited off-farm work; hence, the problem of participation 
by the labour-constrained poor becomes relatively marginal in slack seasons. 
4  Conclusion 
The predictability of public works schemes is essential to the fulfilment of their dual-
objective social protection function, and this means such programmes should be long-term, 
or should offer repeated access. A contrast between the outcomes from the above case 
studies and a temporary public works programme, such as South Africa’s Expended Public 
                                                 
10  Tigay’s population is 81% rural; its rainfall is lower than the country average leading to chronic 
food insecurity, with 85% of households unable to meet their food requirement from own 
production. Around 31% of sample households earn income from wage employment by causal 
labour in seasonal jobs. Tigay was one of the first regions to experience FFW projects, and receives 
the highest share of food aid. The wage rate paid is that of the standard rate for FFW used in 
Ethiopia: 3 kg. of wheat per day. 
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Works Programme (EPWP), makes the importance of this feature abundantly clear.11 
Another critical aspect of their design is to set the programme’s wage-rate low enough for 
the self-targeting of the poor. The need to have a lower programme wage-rate often comes 
into conflict with poverty-line based wage transfers, and, consequently, the poverty 
reduction objective of public works is abandoned. Some regard this outcome as inevitable, 
which implies that public works should choose only one of the two objectives. However, the 
choice may well be largely avoidable if the effect of public works on market wage levels 
(through enhanced productivity) is empirically supported for SSA. Such an effect has 
important policy implications for social protection based upon public works. A temporary 
increase in the programme work requirement, until its market wage effect is manifested, 
would seem to offer an attractive alternative to a reduction in the programme wage-rate. 
This alternative improves self-targeting by the poor, and yet retains the programme’s 
minimum-wage payment, avoiding the damaging consequences of a wage reduction, 
particularly when the minimum is based upon a necessary standard to prevent malnutrition, 
as is typical of public works in SSA. 
The implementation of effective public works schemes in regions with substantial 
labour-constrained poor households is a more challenging problem. However, some 
remedial influences and policy options are available. First, the “structural” exclusion of such 
households might be a smaller problem than is suggested by some if the operation of public 
works leads to increased productivity and hence to increased market wage-rates. The latter 
is likely to reduce targeting error, and raise the participation rate among the labour-
constrained poor. Public works can also allow some of the required work-time to be spent on 
private small farm and marginal lands; and pay transfer wages in cash rather than food 
since, payment in cash has a premium over that of food for subsistence food-producing 
farmers, and hence is closer to the minimum wage rate of labour-constrained households. 
The method of payment, especially task-based pay, is another option to improve targeting. 
Nonetheless, if food insecurity is the principal cause of vulnerability and asset 
depletion, as it is in SSA, then the main concern of public works schemes should be the 
provision of protection through food security for which payment in food remains a preferred 
option, modified in labour-constrained regions as suggested above. This is particularly so 
with regard to the landless poor since wage payment in food provides protection against 
income shocks in two correlated, food and labour, markets in lean seasons.12 A temporary 
increase in the quantity of the work required can improve the self-targeting of public FFW 
schemes, particularly during critical periods of droughts and lean seasons when choice 
between on-farm and off-farm work for the poor is limited. However, the implementation of 
a scheme similar to the PSNP elsewhere in SSA would require the incorporation of some 
kind of indexing of cash to food payment in its design in order to avoid disparity. An obvious 
example is Malawi’s Food and Cash Transfers (FACT) project, since its innovative feature, 
index-linking the monthly cash transfers to the previous month’s market prices of food to 
                                                 
11  EPWP is a large-scale expansion of labour intensive construction methods offering temporary work. 
However, the programme’s record suggests limited impact. The EPWP wage transfer is rather low, 
leaving over 90% of the participants below poverty line. The mean duration of EPWP employment 
is only four months, and the work is of a one-off nature. The EPWP asset generation is mainly 
based upon its skill creation components, but the great majority of its projects offer only basic on-
the-job training, or “lifeskills”, for example, HIV information, with little long-term impact, rather 
than vocational and entrepreneurship trainings. The result is a temporary “wage shock”: most 
participants return to the same unemployment or causal work positions held prior to participation, 
and there is no significant increase in self-employment, McCord (2006). 
12  One further factor which works in favour of FFW schemes compared to cash transfers is that 
women usually prefer wage payment in food rations and men in cash, and there is evidence of 
greater benefits to children when women receive the transfers. 
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maintain food-cash parity has a successful record of minimising the impact of food price 
inflation; Devereux(2008). 
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